Standard Operation Guidelines for an Active Shooter

Joel A. Atkinson

Clinton Fire Department Clinton, Iowa
Certification Statement

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and appropriate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

Signed: ______________________________

Joel A. Atkinson
Abstract

The problem is the Clinton Fire Department (CFD) does not know its functions in an active-shooter incident. The purpose of this research is to determine the roles the CFD will take in an active-shooter incident in their response district. The following descriptive research questions were used:

1. How are other Fire/EMS departments responding to active-shooter incidents?
2. How would the CFD’s active-shooter incident roles interface with the Clinton Police Department’s active-shooter guidelines?
3. What roles will the CFD be willing to fulfill in an active-shooter incident?

A literature review was completed using the U.S. Fire Administration Library and an extensive on-line search on active-shooter responses. Recent periodical articles were found during the on-line search that covered new trends in both law enforcement and Fire/EMS response to an active-shooter incidents.

The researcher did a nationwide on-line survey of other fire departments to determine what role they fulfill in an active-shooter incidents. An interview was conducted with Captain William Greenwalt of the Clinton Police Department (CPD) to understand their standard operation guidelines. The interview also helped determine how the CFD and CPD could improve interoperability during an active-shooter incident. A focus group was developed with CFD’s Battalion Chiefs to discuss the roles the CFD was willing to fulfill during an active-shooter incidents.

The results of the research found that Fire/EMS can no longer “standby” and wait for the scene to be secured prior to making entry and treating the victims. A strong unified Incident Command must be established so the rescue teams can be utilized. Fire/EMS
must team-up with law enforcement, enter the warm zone to rapidly treat and remove victims.

The recommendation was to establish a committee to develop a written standard operation guidelines for the CFD. The committee will also be tasked with developing a scenario-based training program for both area Fire/EMS and law enforcement departments.
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Introduction

The Columbine School shooting in 1999 really started a national discussion on how firefighters/EMS should respond to active shooter incidents. Many active-shooter incidents have happened around the world since this incident. More than 250 people have been killed in active-shooter incidents since Columbine (U.S. Fire Administration, 2013, para. 1). Each time an active-shooter incident happens first responders refine their response model to improve their ability to eliminate the threat and treat the wounded. The Clinton Fire Department has never defined their role in an active-shooter incident.

The problem is the Clinton Fire Department does not know its functions in an active-shooter incident in their response district. The purpose of this research is to determine the roles the Clinton Fire Department will take in an active-shooter incident in their response district.

The following three questions will be answered through descriptive method of research. How are other Fire/EMS departments responding to active-shooter incidents? How would the Clinton Fire Department’s active-shooter role interface with the Clinton Police Department’s active-shooter guidelines? What role will the Clinton Fire Department be willing to fulfill in an active-shooter incident?
Background and Significance

Clinton, Iowa has an estimated population of 26,473 and encompasses 35 square miles (US Census Bureau, 2013), the community’s eastern city limits is the Mississippi River and the western area of the community is mostly rural farm land. Clinton has a large industrial and commercial presence in the area with a large number of workers coming into the community from smaller rural communities.

The Clinton Fire Department consists of three fire stations and 43 line personnel and two staff positions. The Fire Department responded to over 4300 calls for service in 2014 with three ALS ambulances and three ALS first response engines for our fire district. The Fire Department currently has automatic mutual aid with Camanche, Iowa and Fulton, IL for all structure fires within our respected fire districts. The Fire Department is a member of the Illinois Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS). The Clinton Fire Department provides protection for two highway bridges over the Mississippi River and major natural gas transmission supply lines to our industry base. The Fire Department also provides protection to a major industrial concentration that includes bio-diesel, ethanol, and plastic manufacturing. The Union Pacific Railroad Turn-Table Bridge which is the main east-west artery rail crossing the Mississippi River for the nation’s largest railroad is part of the state’s critical infrastructure within our fire district. Clinton is the largest community within the 10-mile evacuation radius of the Quad City Nuclear Power Plant and provides radiological first responder support in case of a nuclear/radiation accident at the plant.
An active-shooter incident can be defined as “an armed person who has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims” (Morrissey, 2011, para. 7). Active-shooter incidents can be broken down into two types of attacks: spontaneous and planned attacked. Spontaneous active-shooter incidents are when the subject may have experienced a significant negative event; goes and retrieves a firearm and returns and starts killing people (Morrissey, 2011, para. 9). Planned active-shooting events are far less common, but usually result in more casualties. Police and Fire/EMS are at a higher risk during a planned event because they may also be the target of the perpetrator (Morrissey, 2011, para. 10).

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the following statistics help define an active shooter incident:

- Active-shooter incidents often occur in small and medium sized communities where police departments are limited by budget constraints and small workforces.
- The average-active shooter incident lasts twelve minutes. Thirty-seven percent last less than five minutes.
- Overwhelmingly, ninety-eight percent of the offenders is a single shooter, ninety-seven percent are male and forty percent of the shooters kill themselves.
- Two percent of the shooters bring improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as additional weapons.
- In ten percent of the cases, the shooter stops and walks away. In twenty percent of the cases, the shooter goes mobile, moving to another location.
• Forty-three percent of the time the crime is over before police arrive. In fifty-seven percent of the shootings an officer arrives while the shooting is still underway.

• The shooter often stops as soon as he hears or sees law enforcement, sometimes turning his/her anger or aggression on law enforcement.

• Patrol officers are most likely to responding alone or with a partner. When responding alone seventy-five percent of the officers will take action.

• A third of those officers who enter the incident alone are shot by the intruder.

Being a medium size city with limited budget and police/fire’s limited resources makes Clinton, Iowa a higher risk for an active shooter event (Schweit, 2013, para. 3).

The Clinton Fire Department personnel have trained for mass casualty incidents (MCIs), but has had very limited training in response to an active-shooter incidents. Currently, the Fire Department’s past practice has been to stage at violent incidents until the police officers deem the scene is safe. The paramedics will then enter the area and treat the victims. In an active shooter incident it could take an hour or more to completely clear the scene of other threats such as a second shooter or improvised explosive devices (Morrissey, 2011, para. 4).

In 2013 the Clinton Fire Department started a tactical medical team to work with the area SWAT team during high risk entries. Six firefighter/paramedics are part of the tactical medic program. They train monthly with the area police department on hazard entries. No other members of the Clinton Fire Department have any interoperability
training with area law enforcement agencies. It is important that Fire/EMS and law enforcement hold joint training. Each organization can benefit from each other’s knowledge such as force entry and hemorrhage-control techniques for law enforcement. Police can train Fire/EMS on quick movements and shielding while moving within their secured perimeter (Krebs, 2014. P. 32). The Clinton Fire Department and the Clinton Police Department do not currently participate in any of these types of training.

The Clinton Fire Department clearly does not understand their role when responding to an active-shooter incident. Currently they would use the “standby” response which would result in an increase loss of life at the incident. The Clinton Fire Department presently lacks training and interoperability with local law enforcement when responding to these high risk incidents.

This applied research project directly relates to the National Fire Academy’s Executive Analysis of Community Risk Reduction by changing the organizational culture to reduce the life loss due to an active-shooter incident.

This applied research project helps address the US Fire Administration 2012 goal #2: Improve local planning and preparedness.

Literature Review

The literature review was started by researching the recommended roles fire departments and emergency medical services (EMS) should fulfill during an active-shooter incident. Literature review was done to determine the role of the paramedics, company officers and the command officers should perform during an active-shooter
incident. The research also looked at the interoperability of these roles with responding law enforcement.

The standard of the fire service “standing by” during a violent incident response is outdated in terms of responding to an active-shooter incident. Fire service should use “risk-benefit” evaluation when operating at an active-shooter incident. The mission of the fire service must evolve to operate in a higher risk area during these types of incidents to save more lives (Atwater, 2013, para. 5).

The old “standby” or staging policy allowing very limited risk taken by the Fire /EMS departments would delay access to the victims causing an increase loss of life. The only way the fire service is going to have a positive impact on victim’s life during active-shooter incidents is by having rapid access, removal and transporting them to appropriate medical facilities (Atwater, 2013, para. 7).

Many organizations are using the acronym THREAT when determining the needed response to an active-shooter incident:

- Threat suppression
- Hemorrhage control
- Rapid Extrication to safety
- Assessment by medical providers
- Transport to definitive care

By using THREAT, responders have the ability to improve the survival of victims involved in the active-shooter incident. Rapid hemorrhage control is essential for survival during active-shooter incidents (Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance Survivability from Mass Casualty Shooting Events, 2013, para. 1).
The active-shooter incident should be broken down into three zones; hot zone, warm zone and the cold zone:

- **Hot zone** is the area where the shooter is or likely to be located. Fire/EMS should not operate in this area.
- **Warm zone** is the area that law enforcement has found no immediate threats during their movement towards the assailant(s). The police officers should establish a perimeter for protecting responders working inside this area. The risk to Fire/EMS increase while operating in this area.
- **Cold zone** is where the command post, staging and mass casualty components should be established. Very little risk to responders occurs in this zone.

Breaking down the incident into zones helps every responder understand their responsibilities during an emergency response to a violent incident (Atwater, 2013, para. 6).

**Incident Command System (ICS)** should be used at all active-shooter incidents. The cold zone should contain the command post and all other essential command functions. The ICS should have a unified command made up of command staff from law enforcement, Fire/EMS and an agency representative who is familiar with the building. The command post must maintain direct radio communication with police officers and firefighters working in the hot and warm zones. The fire service can fill many roles in the ICS such a unified incident commander, staging officer, planning officer, logistics officer and public information officer (Morrissey, 2011, para. 30).
Armed police officers are the only first responders operating in the hot zone. The shooter is likely located in this area. The current response for law enforcement is to advance towards the shooter with whatever resources are available. One or two police officer may advance toward the sounds of gun shots with the goal is to neutralize the threat as quickly as possible (Morrissey, 2011, para. 29). The hot zone is too dangerous for Fire/EMS to operate in safely (Atwater, 2013, para. 6).

The warm zone is the area that properly trained firefighters can reach and treat victims. In order to save as many victims as possible EMS/Fire/Rescue must be involved early in the incident. Hemorrhage control is the primary goal of all first responders (Joint Committee, 2013, para. 2).

Many jurisdictions are using the concept of Rescue Task Force (RTFs). The RTFs operate in the warm zone with the objective of rapid patient care, patient removal or shelter the victim in place. The RTFs will be operating in area where there is still a ballistic or explosive threat. The area could also change from a warm zone to a hot zone in a moment’s notice (U.S. Fire Administration, 2013, p.9).

The RTFs are comprised of Fire/EMS and armed law enforcement personnel. Depending on the availability of resources will determine the size of the RTFs. They should be small groups with the law enforcement guiding the team from the cold zone to the warm zone. The lead law enforcement officer should use cover and concealment to safely guide the team to the warm zone. Fire/EMS should go to work quickly treating and removing victims. The Fire/EMS personnel should always be under the protection of law enforcement. The area could suddenly become a hot zone and law enforcement should
be prepared to eliminate the threat or escort the team to a safer area (Atwater, 2013, para. 10).

The Fire/EMS personnel need to understand they will be moving quickly, so the equipment they should carry needs to be compact and lightweight. The equipment should include tourniquets, bandage material and a few oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal airways. Fire vehicles may be needed as shields to help safely move RTFs across open areas (Krebs, 2014, p. 34).

Fire/EMS working in warm zone as part of the RTFs should be equipped with ballistic body armor. The standard body armor worn by police officers will stop hand guns rounds, but may not be effective in an active-shooter incident. Twenty-five percent of active shooter incidents involve a rifle. It is important that everyone working in the hot or warm zone wear ballistic body armor for their protection (Krebs, 2014, p. 34).

The extensive literature review found an extensive paper developed by FEMA on Fire/EMS response to active-shooter incidents. Many articles related to a successful emergency response to active-shooter incidents were found in professional journals. No federal, state or local regulations pertaining to active-shooter responses were found in the literature review. The literature clearly defined the roles Fire/EMS should fulfill during an active-shooter incidents. The literature review helped develop the survey questions asked to other fire departments, interview questions and focus group discussion.

Procedures

The research method used to gather data for this applied research project was a descriptive method. A survey was sent out via SurveyMonkey® nationwide by several list servers. An interview was conducted with the Operations Captain at the Clinton
Police Department. A focus group was conducted with the Clinton Fire Department command staff.

The first research question asked how other Fire/EMS departments are responding to active-shooter incidents. The survey was developed using computer software SurveyMonkey® and was sent out nationwide by several contacts. The survey asked ten questions regarding their department’s response to active-shooter incidents. Thirty-seven fire departments responded to the anonymous survey. The limitations to this survey were because it was totally random and voluntary. These limitations may have limited the number of responses to the survey. The survey is included in appendix A.

The second research question asked how would the Clinton Fire Department’s active-shooter role interface with the Clinton Police Department’s active-shooter guidelines. An interview was conducted with Clinton Police Department’s Operations Captain William Greenwalt. The interview is included in appendix B.

The final research question asked what role the Clinton Fire Department will be willing to fulfill during an active-shooter incident. The command staff of the Clinton Fire Department met in a focus group to discuss the role the department is willing to fulfill in an active-shooter event. The limitations could be that only staff officers participated in the focus group. The focus group notes are included in appendix C.

Results

The national survey of fire departments in regards to their roles in an active-shooter incident produced 37 responses. The first four survey questions were asked to develop the demographics of the responders. The size of the fire department 15 of 37 or
40 percent of the responders answered they had 50 or less members. The survey found 16 of 37 or 43 percent stated they had 51 to 151 members. In addition six or 16 percent responded they had 151 or more firefighters in their fire department.

The survey found that 24 of 37 or 65 percent of the responding fire departments are from career fire departments. Volunteer fire departments make up only 2 of 37 or 5 percent of the responders to the survey. It also revealed that 11 of 37 or 30 percent of the responders were members of combination fire departments. The assessment revealed that 21 of 37 or 54 percent of the fire districts had a population of 50,000 or less. The next greatest populations (50,001 to 249,999) was 13 of 37 or 35 percent. Finally, 4 of 37 or 11 percent of the responders protect a population greater than 250,000 people.

A majority of the survey responders 21 of 37 or 57 percent provide fire base EMS at the first responder level. Transport service is provide by 15 of 37 or 41 percent of the fire departments. Just one fire department or 2 percent provide no EMS care to their community. The survey asked if their department has a tourniquet protocol, 26 of 37 or 70 percent responded they had a written protocol.

The survey showed that 17 of 37 or 46 percent of the fire departments have a written active-shooter policy. Of those surveyed 24 of 37 or 65 percent hold join training with law enforcement on active-shooter incidents. Only two departments have issued their members body armor, but four departments are considering purchasing body armor for the safety of their members.

Another area surveyed was the type of emergency response each fire department will provide during an active-shooter response. Thirty-two or 86 percent of the fire
departments will stage until law enforcement secures the incident. Twenty-two or 59 percent will send their members to work in the warm zone.

The second research question asked how the Clinton Fire Department’s active-shooter role will interface with the Clinton Police Department’s active-shooter policy. An interview was held with Captain William Greenwalt. Captain Greenwalt is a 24 year veteran of the Clinton Police Department. He has held the position of Operations Captain since 2012. In 2009, he earned his certification in Train-the-Trainer in the Advance Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) program, this is the national standard for law enforcement responding to active-shooter incidents.

When Captain Greenwalt was asked if the Clinton Police Department had a written policy for an active-shooter incident he replied “no”. They have provided training to the police officers on responding to active-shooter incidents, but no written policy has been developed. The police officers are trained to develop teams of two and advance towards the shooter by sounds of gun fire. The goal is to neutralize the shooter as quickly as possible.

Captain Greenwalt was asked what roles the Clinton Fire Department should fulfill at an active shooter event. He felt the Clinton Fire Department would establish a unified command system with the Clinton Police Department. The on-duty Battalion Chief would assume the Fire Incident Commander (IC) and establish a stationary command post in the cold zone. Initially, the Police Shift Commander would be a mobile commander until more resources arrive on scene. The Fire Department should establish Rescue Task Force (RTFs) teams with responding law enforcement officers to enter the warm zone, treat and rapidly remove the victims. It is Captain Greenwalt’s opinion that
Fire/EMS should wear ballistic armored vests when entering as part of the RTFs. He felt the cost-benefit is worth the financial investment to protect everyone responding to the incident.

Captain Greenwalt felt both the police and fire departments should train together for an active-shooter incident. He felt it should start with planning meetings, followed by a table top exercise. Finally, a full simulated active-shooter training session should be held.

The third research question asks what roles the Clinton Fire Department is willing to fulfill during an active-shooter incident. A focus group was held with the command staff of the Clinton Fire Department to discuss the roles the Clinton Fire Department is willing to fulfill during an active-shooter incident. Participating in the focus group were Battalion Chief Jeff Chapman, Battalion Chief Andrew McGovern, Battalion Chief Fredrick Roling and the group was facilitated by Battalion Chief Joel Atkinson.

The first topic of discussion was what role the command staff would fulfill during an active-shooter incident. The command staff would not have an issue of establishing a stationary command post and assuming a unified command with the police department’s shift supervisor. The police department command would be a mobile command early in the incident. The group had concerns about how they would communicate with the police command early in the incident because of different radio frequencies. The group felt it would be important to have the police commander at the command post as soon as possible.

The next topic of discussion was whether the Fire Incident Commander would have an issue giving direction to the responding police officer such as establishing
Rescue Task Force Teams (RTFs). No one in the group had an issue directing police officers as well as firefighters during an active-shooter event. The group again expressed concern of being able to communicate with responding law enforcement agencies.

The question was asked if the Clinton Fire Department’s medics should participate in the RTFs and what safety equipment they should wear. All members of the focus group felt that the fire/medics should fill the role as a member of the RTFs. The lack of training for this new role was a major concern. All members of the focus group felt joint training with law enforcement should be a priority. Chief Roling did not have an issue sending Fire/EMS into the warm zone without ballistic body armor if they had proper law enforcement protection. Chief Chapman would feel better if they had ballistic body armor provided to them. He would still send them into the warm zone without the protection with proper law enforcement protection. Chief McGovern would not send Fire/EMS into the warm zone without ballistic body armor.

A comprehensive analysis of the data revealed that 46 percent of the surveyed fire departments have a written standard operation guidelines for active shooter incidents. Neither the Clinton Police Department nor the Clinton Fire Department have a written active shooter policy. The Clinton Fire Department and 59 percent of the surveyed fire departments are willing to work in the warm zone. The Clinton Police Department supports having Fire/EMS working in the warm zone.

Training Fire/EMS to work in the warm zone was a major concern of the Clinton Fire Department’s focus group. The survey group felt training was important for interoperability with law enforcement. The survey showed 65 percent of the fire
departments have joint training with law enforcement. The Clinton Police Department
strongly supports joint training with the Clinton Fire Department so everyone
understands their roles in active-shooter incidents. Both the focus group and the Clinton
Police Department support Fire/EMS wearing ballistic body armor, but only two fire
departments surveyed provide body armor for their Fire/EMS.

Discussion

The applied research project was chosen because the Clinton Fire Department
does not know its functions in an active-shooter incident. While researching the problem
through a literature review found the current method of staging Fire/EMS in the cold
zone was not providing the proper level of care to the victims. Scene safety has been
entrenched in fire/EMS personnel from the early stages of their training. Incident
Commanders may hesitate to send fire/EMS into the warm zone. The culture of
Fire/EMS responders is to accept risk when responding to common operational incidents,
but not except as much risk in the name of safety when responding in non- common
operations (Smith, 2013, para, 5). The true risk to Fire/EMS operating in the warm zone
is very low (Smith, 2013, para. 3). Captain Greenwalt and the Clinton Fire
Department’s focus group agreed in order to have the most impact on the victim’s
survivability in an active-shooter incident, Fire/EMS personnel must work in the warm
zone. The survey conducted during the research found the majority of the fire
departments are willing to send fire/Medics into the warm zone to treat victims.

An International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Position Statement on
active-shooter events stresses the need for a strong Incident Command System. A single
command post should be established and a unified command should be established with
fire and law enforcement officers (n.d., para. 5). The focus group supported the IAFF Position Statement of having an established command post with a unified command with law enforcement. Captain Greenwalt believed the Clinton Police Department would have a mobile Incident Commander because they lack the resources to have someone dedicated to the command post during the early stages of an active-shooter incident. When they had the resources they would dedicate the Incident Commander to the command post for a stronger unified command.

The Rescue Task Force (RTFs) is the safest and quickest way to get to injured victims under the protection of law enforcement (Atwater, 2013, para. 9-10). The greater a delay of getting Fire/EMS to the shooting victims the greater the death rate at the incident (Morrissey, 2011, para. 8). The survey revealed that 59 percent would operate in the warm zone. Captain Greenwalt is in favor of establishing RTFs. He felt that the escort officers would be from the State Patrol or from neighboring communities’ law enforcement. The discussion group did not have an issue dispatching RTFs into the warm zone. Communities with limited law enforcement response would have a difficult time both eliminating the threat and removing the victims to the cold zone in a timely manner (Smith, 2013, para. 6). Both Captain Greenwalt and the discussion group felt ballistic body armor for Fire/EMS was important for their safety.

Police and Fire/EMS must train together when it comes to an active-shooter incidents for a successful operation (IAFF, n.d., para. 9). Captain Greenwalt feels the only way everyone is going to understand their roles is by training together. The focus group would not send their medics into the warm zone without having joint scenario-
based training with law enforcement. A large percentage of survey responders train with law enforcement on active-shooter responses.

The author believes the literature review, the nationwide fire department survey, the interview with Clinton Police Department’s Captain William Greenwalt and the Clinton Fire Department’s focus group clearly defines the functions the Clinton Fire Department should fulfill during an active-shooter incident. The Clinton Fire Department should establish a unified command with the Clinton Police Department. The Fire Department’s Incident Commander must institute a command post in the cold zone. The Police Department’s Incident Commander maybe mobile early in the incident so clear radio communications is a must.

The Fire/EMS must develop Rescue Task Force (RTFs) teams with law enforcement and prepare to enter the warm zone. When law enforcement has an area cleared by law enforcement officers the RTFs can be sent into the warm zone to treat and rapidly remove the victims to a triage area in the cold zone. Normal mass casualty incident protocols can be followed when the victims are in the cold zone. By following these roles the Clinton Fire Department can have a great impact on victim mortality during an active-shooter incident in their community.

Recommendation

The recommendation is for the Clinton Fire Department to develop a written standard operation guideline that clearly defines their roles in an active-shooter incident. A committee should be established to develop a well-defined written standard operation guideline for the Clinton Fire Department. The committee should be comprised of members from Clinton Fire Department and the Clinton Police Department. The
committee should develop a scenario-based training exercise for both departments. The committee should look at the following issues:

- The incident command system.
- Interoperability between Fire/EMS and law enforcement.
- Acceptance of the new roles by Fire/EMS.
- Terminology used by both police and Fire/EMS.
- Radio communication.
- Fire/EMS training.
- Training between fire and law enforcement.

The implementation of these recommendations by the Clinton Fire Department will clearly define their roles in an active-shooter incident. The recommendations will help the Clinton Fire Department save more lives during an active-shooter incident.
References


Appendix A

Fire Department Survey

1. What is the size of your fire department?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firefighters</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 or less</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 to 150</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 or greater</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What is the demographic of your fire department?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. What is the population of your fire district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50,000 or less</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,001 to 249,999</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 and greater</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Does your department provided fire based EMS?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of service</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First responder</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport service</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Does your department have an active-shooter policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Does your department train with law enforcement on active-shooter incidents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Does your fire department issue body armor to all personnel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considering issuing body armor.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. During active-shooter incidents does your department stage until your law enforcement secures the incident?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. During active-shooter incidents does your department operate in the warm zone?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Does your department have a tourniquet protocol?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Interview with Clinton Police Department

Operation Captain William Greenwalt

1. Captain Greenwalt what is your experience with the Clinton Police Department? I have been with the Clinton Police Department for 24 years. I worked myself through the ranks achieving Operations Captain three years ago.

2. What is your training in active-shooter incidents? I am certified as an Active Shooter Level I Train-the-Trainer in the Advance Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) program, this is the national standard training for law enforcement responding to active-shooter incidents. I attend this training in July, 2009.

3. Does the Clinton Police Department have a written active-shooter response policy? We train our police officers how to respond to active-shooter incidents, but there is no written policy.

4. How would the Clinton Police Department respond to an active-shooter incident? We would respond with all on-duty officers, this number varies depending on the time of the day. We would probably have about five officers on scene in a short amount of time. They would immediately enter and try to neutralize the threat as quickly as possible.

5. How do you think the Clinton Fire Department would interact with this response? We would look for your department to establish a stationary command post. Our incident command early in the incident would be a
mobile incident commander. We would try to get someone to the command post as soon as possible to establish a unified stationary command system. We would want the fire department to develop Rescue Task Force (RTFs) to make entry into the warm zone to treat victims. The RTFs would be developed using police officers from other departments. I feel more communication needs to be done between departments.

6. Do you think Clinton Police and Fire Departments should train together for an active-shooter incident in our community? Definitely, we should start with a planning meeting, then maybe a table top scenario and finally a simulated active-shooter incident.

7. What is your opinion on fire/EMS wearing ballistic vest when working in the warm zone? I think it is important to protect the people the best we can. I think the cost-benefit is worth the investment.
Appendix C

Clinton Fire Department’s Command Staff Discussion Group Participants: Battalion Chief Jeff Chapman, Battalion Chief Fredrick Roling, Battalion Chief Andrew McGovern and Battalion Chief Joel Atkinson (Facilitator)

1. As a shift commander for the Clinton Fire Department would you have an issue establishing a stationary command post in the cold zone? Realizing that the Clinton Police Department may be have a mobile Incident Commander at the time of your arrival. All members of the group would not have an issue establishing a stationary command post, being the fire department Incident Commander (IC) and communicating with the mobile police IC. Every member had concerns on how the police and fire command would communicate with each other being on different radio frequencies.

2. Would you as the fire IC have an issue giving direction to responding police officers such as establishing Rescue Task Force Teams (RTFs) or directing setting up a perimeter around the building? No one in the group had an issue directing police officers as well as firefighters during an active shooter event. Everyone expressed a need to have a law enforcement IC at the command post as quickly as possible. They felt having a unified stationary command is very important because of the possibility of communication issue and the difficulty developing an incident action plan without face-to-face communication. Everyone in the group had a concerns over their personal knowledge of police tactics during an active-shooter incident. It was felt that joint training could overcome these issues.
3. Do you think that the fire/medics should have ballistic body armor immediately available for their protection during an active-shooter event? All members believe that ballistic body armor should be available to the fire/medic working as part of the RFTs. The group was undecided if the fire/medics should have ballistic head protection.

4. Would you have an issue having fire/medics be part of a Rescue Task Force (RTFs) during an active shooter incident? All members of the group stated they would not have a problem deploying fire/medics as part of a RTFs. An important issue would be that all members are trained in their role as part of the RTFs. Chief Roling and Chief Chapman would not have an issue sending fire/medics into the warm zone without ballistic body armor. Chief McGovern felt the fire/medics should have ballistic body armor protection prior to entering the warm zone.